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This paper extends the standard model of life cycle consumption, saving and labor supply in a number of 
directions.  First, it argues that consumption should be defined as expenditure on household production as 
well as on market goods, that is, we are interested in life cycle profiles of full consumption.  If this is done, 
several well-known puzzles concerning life cycle consumption behaviour are resolved.  Secondly, we stress 
the importance of the heterogeneity of household behaviour in respect of female labour supply and saving, 
and provide evidence that these are very closely related across households.  Finally, we formulate 
theoretical and empirical models incorporationg these ideas and use them to show that  policy changes, 
such as a reduction in the progressivity of income taxation, can have effects that contrast sharply  with 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
T h ec o r eo ft h el i f ec y c l em o d e l 1 of consumption choice is the hypothesis that
the household chooses its consumption at any point in time in the light of its
entire lifetime income stream, using the capital market to decouple current
consumption from current income, so as to keep its discounted marginal util-
ity of consumption constant over time. Almost invariably, “consumption”
is expenditure on goods and services bought in markets, and the income
stream that appears (usually exogenously) in the model is market wage in-
come. When the predicted consumption and saving paths are compared to
the data there are striking di¤erences, which are then presented as puzzles in
need of explanation. Two of the most important are: the excess sensitivity
of consumption to income, in the sense that current consumption seems to
track current income more closely than would seem to be implied by opti-
mally relating consumption to lifetime income; and the occurrence of larger
falls in consumption upon retirement than seem to be consistent with the
model2.
However, as a number of authors have pointed out3, the consumption
and income variables de…ned in these models are in fact only components of
the actual total consumption and income magnitudes. Households allocate
their time not just between work and (pure) leisure, but also between market
and household labour supply, which may be close substitutes4.R e d e … n i n g
consumption in the model as the total value of the consumption of market
and domestically produced goods, which we here call full consumption,c a n
resolve the excess sensitivity puzzle. The household may well be choosing its
full consumption path to maintain a constant marginal utility of consump-
tion expenditure, but this is quite consistent with the observed correlation
1For a comprehensive survey of the theory and evidence see Deaton (1992). See also
the interesting survey by King (1985) and accompanying comment by Diamond (1985),
who both emphasise, as we do in this paper, the heterogeneity of household consumption
behavior.
2For presentation and discussion of this puzzle see in particular Banks, Blundell and
Tanner (1998). We provide a resolution of it in the next section of this paper.
3See, for example Baxter and Jermann (1999), Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991),
McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997), and Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (1995),(1996).
4The importance of these substitution possibilities has been emphasised by Benhabib
et al., Mcgrattan et al., and Rupert et al., who show theoretically and empirically the
signi…cant e¤ects they can have in real business cycle models.
1between current market wage income and market consumption5.T h e e v i -
dence we present in this paper shows that changes in female labour supply,
associated with the basic transitions in the life cycle of the household and
corresponding changes in the degree of substitution of market for domestic
outputs, are the major determinants of consumption and saving. More im-
portantly, however, there is a very high degree of heterogeneity of households
in these respects, and the description and explanation of this, as well as an
analysis of some of its consequences for policy, are the major themes of this
paper6.
Most of the discussion of the life cycle model takes place in the “repre-
sentative agent” framework. However, for purposes of empirical estimation
and policy analysis it is important to construct models that allow for and
explain the diversity of behaviour that in reality exists. If heterogeneity is
important, then aggregate behaviour will not in general be well explained or
predicted by aggregate variables. Policy changes, such as reductions in the
degree of progressivity in the tax structure, even if revenue neutral7,c a nh a v e
important e¤ects on saving, via their di¤erential incidence across household
types8.
We want to pursue the implications of two points. First, households
show an important kind of diversity in their labour supply behaviour, in that
there is wide variation in the market labour supply of the secondary earner.
Secondly, this labour supply diversity seems to be associated with di¤erences
in saving behaviour. As we show below, most saving appears to be carried
out by households in which there is a signi…cant market labour supply of
5This argument could be interpreted as rejecting the usual assumption of the separa-
bility of leisure and consumption that underlies the standard result, on the basis of a more
careful characterisation of the possible uses of time not spent in market work. This is made
clear in Baxter and Jermann (1999), who argue that as the wage rate increases over the
life cycle, the price of domestic goods rises relative to market goods, causing consumption
of the latter therefore to increase with income. This resembles the argument in Heckman
(1974), who showed that the positive correlation between current income and consumption
over the life cycle obtained by Thurow (1969), would be generated, in the non-separable
case, by the age pro…le of wage rates. In this paper, we propose a somewhat di¤erent
explanation of the process of substitution between domestic and market consumption over
the life cycle.
6This heterogeneity is not taken into account in the papers discussed in the previous
footnotes.
7In a companion paper to this, Apps and Rees (1999c), we analyse this question further.
8This is in addition to the fact, shown in McGrattan et al., that introducing domestic
production ”generates di¤erent predictions than similar models without home production”.
2the secondary earner. The standard modelling framework, in which the only
explanatory variables are demographics, wage rates and non-labour incomes,
cannot account for these across-household variations. The aim of this paper is
to construct a life cycle model which can provide a theoretical and empirical
b a s i sf o rt h e s eo b s e r v a t i o n s ,a n dt h e ns h o wh o wi tc a nb ec a l i b r a t e da n d
used to analyse the e¤ects of the kinds of policy changes that are currently
under discussion in a number of countries. We base our explanation of across-
household variation in female labour supply on di¤erences in human capital,
which cause variation in productivity in domestic production9.
In the next section we present life cycle pro…les of consumption, saving
and labour supplies, obtained by merging information on income, household
expenditure and time use available in three di¤erent data sets. The results
suggest a pattern of consumption over the life cycle that is very di¤erent from
that obtained by studies of consumption expenditure on market goods alone.
The following section then presents a model of the household’s decisions on
consumption, saving and labour supplies over the life cycle. We go on to
formulate a simpli…ed version of the model in Section 4 and we estimate the
behavioural parameters for an empirical speci…cation of the within-period
demand system set out in Section 5. In Section 6 we use the estimated
parameters to analyse the e¤ects of changes in the system of income taxation
on saving over the life cycle. Section 7 concludes.
2 Some Evidence on Life Cycle Pro…les
We …nd it most useful to begin by expressing the life cycle not in terms of
years, but rather in terms of six phases, which seem to us to capture the
major transitions in a household’s lifetime. These are:
9Thus as Becker points out: “Human capital might [...] change the productivity of time
and goods used in producing household consumption or in producing additional human
capital itself”. Becker (1976), p126. The importance of domestic relative to market
productivity is also stressed by Benhabib et al., who argue: ”When individuals are able
to substitute between market and nonmarket production over time, volatility in market
activity can arise because of relative productivity di¤erentials between the two sectors,
and not just absolute productivity shocks”. Here we introduce domestic human capital as
an explanatory variable capturing di¤erences in domestic productivities which may be due
to a range of factors, as well as to previous human capital investments or inherent skills.
The modelling approach is an extension of Apps and Rees (1988), (1999a,b).
3² Phase 1: the adult household members are of working age and do not
yet have children;
² Phase 2: the household has children of pre-school age;
² Phase 3: the children are of primary school age;
² Phase 4: the children are of high school age or have left school;
² Phase 5: the adults are still of working age but the children have left
home;
² Phase 6: the adults are retired.
Ideally panel data are required to compute life cycle consumption, saving
and labour supply pro…les de…ned on these phases. Given that panel data
are not available, we use micro-level cross section data. We draw information
on consumption, saving, wage rates, market incomes and the allocation of
time to market work, domestic work and pure leisure from three surveys of
the same underlying population: the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS)
1993 Household Expenditure Survey (HES), the ABS 1993-4 Income Distri-
bution Survey (IDS) and the ABS 1992 Time Use Survey (TUS). All three
surveys are required because there are missing variables in each. The HES
su¤ers from insu¢cient detail on market hours of work and non-market time
use. There is no consumption and non-market time use data in the IDS, and
information on wages and non-labour incomes is missing in the TUS. The
three surveys contain detailed information on a common set of demographic
characteristics and personal attributes of family members. We combine infor-
mation on two–adult households contained in these surveys, using matching
samples from each. The full sample of two-adult households drawn from
the HES contains 5062 records, from the IDS, 4276 records, and from the
TUS, 1906 records. The empirical analysis to follow is based on records
from the HES and IDS samples, augmented with information on pure leisure
and domestic work using the methodology of split-sample instrumental vari-
ables. We also instrument the net wage for each partner in both samples.
The merging procedures and estimation of net wage rates are described in
Appendix A.10
10The analysis, in e¤ect, is based on a single cross section (all results are presented in
1993 prices) and therefore does not take account of cohort e¤ects. While we recognise
4Table 1 reports life cycle pro…les of median net household income, expen-
diture on market goods, and saving, in columns 1 to 3, respectively, for the
t w o - a d u l th o u s e h o l d si nt h eH E Ss a m p l e .C e l ls i z ei ss h o w ni nc o l u m n6 .T h e
pro…les are broadly consistent with the existing literature. The excess sensi-
tivity puzzle is con…rmed by the pro…les in columns 1 and 2 which show the
strong tendency of household consumption to track net household income.
This is brought out clearly in Figure 1. The pro…le of median consumption
expenditure over phases 2 to 6 exhibits the usual “hump” shape. The highest
median consumption expenditure coincides with the highest net income in
phase 4. From the pro…les in these columns it is also clear that much of the
hump in consumption, and the relatively low rates of saving in phases 2 to
4, is associated with demographic variation. Saving drops sharply in phase
2 with the arrival of children and fails to rise to near its phase 1 level until
phase 5 when the children have left home.
However, an analysis of this kind, based on market variables alone, gives
a misleading picture of the true life cycle pro…le of consumption and, as we
will show later, of the impact of demographic variation. Column 4 of the
table reports median full consumption expenditure, computed as the sum of
expenditure on market consumption and on domestic output. The latter is
computed as the value of time allocated to domestic production, with time
priced at the net wage11, using the IDS matching sample augmented with
time use data as outlined in Appendix A.12 As Figure 2 illustrates, beyond
phase 1, the pro…le of full consumption expenditure does not exhibit a hump
shape, but rather falls steadily over time from its highest level in phase 2.
Column 5 reports median full income, computed as the income the family
could earn if each partner worked full time, de…ned as 16 hours per day. While
the pro…le of market consumption tracks market income, full consumption
does not track full income. Full consumption is at its highest in phase 2 when
wages are relatively low, then falls steadily. Thus the stylised fact of excess
sensitivity does not hold for full income and full consumption.
that cohort e¤ects can be important, it does not seem to us that they would alter the
direction of our key results.
11On the assumption of constant returns to scale of time inputs in household production,
the expenditure on domestic consumption at the implicit price of domestic output is equal
to the value of time spent in household production.
12As we would expect, the distribution of cell size for the IDS is very similar to that of
the HES and is therefore not reported.
5Table 2 reports mean male and female market hours, domestic hours and
total hours of work, in columns 1 to 6, respectively, using data on hours of
m a r k e tw o r ka n dm e r g e di n f o r m a t i o no nt i m eu s ei nt h eI D Ss a m p l e . T h e
results are illustrated in …gure 3. If we compare the time allocation pro…les
in this table with those for consumption in Table 1, it is immediately clear
that much of the divergence between market consumption and full consump-
tion across phases 1 to 5 re‡ects changes in female labour supply or, more
speci…cally, the reallocation of time from market work to domestic work by
the secondary earner after the arrival of children. In phases 1 to 5, there
is relatively little variation in male market hours but large changes in the
hours of the female partner. While market consumption tracks market in-
come, the latter tracks female labour supply. Note also that female market
work varies inversely with domestic work. This suggests that the two types
of work become close substitutes with the arrival of children. >From phase
1 to 2 female market hours fall by almost two-thirds and do not return to
their phase 1 level at any later phase. While this fall in labour supply is
associated with the arrival of children, we suggest that the key point is that
entry into phase 2 generates a demand for a good for which there is a close
substitute at home. Child care requires a large input of time, whether bought
on the market or supplied domestically, and the two are likely to be close
substitutes13.
The peak in full consumption in phase 2 is perhaps surprising, given that
there are fewer children in this phase than in phase 3, and wage rates are
typically lower. Note also that it is associated with a peak in total hours of
work. An explanation for both is that in this phase, access to market child
care is restricted, with good quality child care di¢cult to …nd at a reasonable
price, while capital market conditions make it very costly to …nance child
care by borrowing. Thus the household’s optimal choice is to reallocate the
mother’s time from market to household, since she generally faces a lower net
wage rate, and for both parents, but especially the mother, to work longer
hours in total in phase 2.
In later years, the cost of children to parents is substantially reduced by
public funding of education and the day care it provides. In other words,
when the child reaches school age the public education system takes over
many of the child-minding activities that the household itself has to under-
take for pre-school children. This allows the female partner to enter the work
13This point is emphasised for example in Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (1995).
6force more easily in phase 3. The e¤ect is accentuated in phase 4 when the
demands of children for services requiring direct time is much lower than in
earlier phases. Household income, labour supply and market consumption
expenditure all peak in phase 4, with teenaged children living at home, while
saving is at its peak in the following phase, when the children have left home
but market labour supply is still high. Thus the pro…le of full consumption
and saving over phases 1 to 5 may, to a signi…cant extent, be an outcome of
capital market constraints and variation in the public funding of the costs of
children.
Turning to the results for phase 6, we would suggest that taking account
of the fact that domestically produced goods are generally substitutes for
market goods also o¤ers a simple resolution of the retirement-consumption
puzzle. Banks, Blundell and Tanner (1998) show that the fall in (market)
consumption on retirement is much larger than can be explained by the re-
duction in work-related expenditures - travel costs, clothing and so on - and
suggest “unanticipated shocks” upon retirement, for example learning that
one’s pension is smaller than expected, as a possible explanation. It seems
more consistent with the life cycle model however to argue that full consump-
tion remains relatively stable, and what we observe is a large substitution of
household for market goods, due of course to the fact that on retirement all
the household’s working time is now devoted to domestic production. This
also explains why, in categories such as expenditure on buying food that is
prepared and consumed at home, Banks, Blundell and Tanner …nd a signi…-
cant fall. There is simply a substitution of own time for market expenditure,
a reversal of the “switch to convenience foods” example, that was so much
used in the early discussions of the Becker household production model. This
is con…rmed by the results in Tables 1 and 2. The decline in full consumption
from phase 5 to phase 6 is small relative to that in market consumption, due
to the increase in the allocation of time to domestic work, particularly by
t h em a l ep a r t n e r . 14
Overall, these data suggest that the excess sensitivity of market consump-
tion to household net market income is simply a re‡ection of the e¤ect of
a household’s decision to have children, on female labour supply on the one
hand, and on the composition of full expenditure as between household and
14Note that the data are likely to understate the true level of consumption in the retire-
ment phase because publicly funded and subsidised services available to those eligible for
the age pension are not included.
7market goods on the other.
As stated in the Introduction, the major concern of this paper is the het-
erogeneity of labour supply and saving behaviour among households with the
same wage rates, non-labour incomes and demographics, which is concealed
in the overall average …gures considered above. We argue that many studies
in the existing literature are misleading, because they simultaneously omit
household production and ignore the evident heterogeneity in household con-
sumption and saving behaviour. To illustrate, we …rst examine the empirical
importance of heterogeneity, using data for matching samples selected on the
additional criterion that the male partner is employed. Since information on
the productivity of domestic time is missing, the dimension along which we
de…ne heterogeneity is female labour supply. The idea, as we make more
precise in the next section, is that households choose lifetime paths of male
and female labour supplies, saving and consumption of household and mar-
ket goods, given wage rates, interest rates and productivities in household
production. Di¤erences in domestic productivities across households lead to
di¤erences in choices of these endogenous variables, for households facing the
same wage and interest rates.
Ideally we would like to distinguish between: those households in which
female labour supply is zero or “marginal”15 throughout the life cycle, which
we refer to as “traditional households”; those in which the female has a
signi…cant and relatively large labour supply over the entire life cycle, which
we call “non-traditional” households; and those which switch from being
traditional to non-traditional at some stage of the life cycle, for example, once
the children have started primary school. This categorisation requires panel
data. Since we are limited to cross section data, we partition households into
three groups, which we assume re‡ect the underlying di¤erences in domestic
productivities that determine household type. These are:
² traditional households, where the wife supplies no market labour or has
no labour income;
² non-traditional households, where the wife works part time (PT);
² non-traditional households, where the wife works full-time (FT).
Tables 3 and 4 present income, consumption, saving and time allocation
pro…les for each of these household types across phases 2 to 5 of the life cycle,
15In the Heckman (1995) sense.
8for matching HES and IDS samples containing households with an employed
male partner. The HES sample contains 2475 household in these phases, of
which 1046 (42.26 per cent) are traditional, 665 (26.89 per cent) are non-
traditional FT, and the remaining 764 (30.87 per cent) are non-traditional
PT. Table 3 reports the pro…les for the same variables as in Table 1 for each
household type. Table 4 gives data means for market and domestic hours of
work in the format of Table 2 using the matching IDS sample16.T h eH E S
cell size is shown in column 6 of Table 3.
From the results it can be seen that there is relatively little within-phase
variation in the average number of children across the three groups. There is
also relatively little variation in full incomes, full consumption and in male
hours of work in each phase. This contrasts with large di¤erences in the
market and domestic hours of work reported for the female partner. There
are also strikingly large di¤erences in saving. Non-traditional households
not only have higher net market incomes, they also have much higher lev-
els of saving, particularly those with a full time employed female partner.17
These results support the hypothesis that households with the same wage
rates and non-labour incomes (or full incomes), and with the same family
commitments, make very di¤erent labour supply and saving decisions. And
those that specialise in market production also save more than those that
specialise in domestic production.18
The existing literature contains a number of studies which examine econo-
metrically how consumption over the life cycle is in‡uenced by labour market
status, especially female labour force participation, as well as by demograph-
16The small positive mean hours of market work for traditional households in phases 2
to 5 re‡ect records reporting zero labour income but positive labour supply.
17Note that income generated by household production is inherently non-saveable.
18These …ndings are open to the objection that the reported di¤erences in saving between
the groups are overstated, because switching households cannot be identi…ed. That this
could be a signi…cant problem is evident from the change in cell size with phase in life
cycle. For example, there are considerably fewer non-traditional FT families in phase 2
than in phases 3 and 4. Comparing saving medians across the three groups can therefore be
expected to overstate the true level of saving by non-traditional households and understate
that of traditional households. A reason for this could be, for example, that a switching
household, classed as traditional in stage 2, may be saving less in stage 2, because it plans
to save more later. Conversely, a switching household, classed as non-traditional in stage
5, may be saving more at that stage to pay o¤ debt incurred in an earlier stage. However,
we would suggest that these e¤ects would need to be implausibly large to o¤set fully the
di¤erences in saving behavour indicated by these cross section comparisions.
9ics and age cohort19. These studies do not support the preceding hypothesis.
They note that female labour force participation appears to have an impor-
tant e¤ect on the sensitivity of consumption to the interest rate, though it is
unclear whether this is due to the fact that there are positive costs associated
with going out to work, or whether female participation increases expected
income and therefore current consumption. The literature seems however to
point to the conclusion, expressed explicitly by Attanasio and Banks (1998)
as
“an increase in female labour force participation is linked to a decrease
in measured saving”
We regard this …nding as misleading and contrary to the evidence we have
presented. If we consider two households with the same household net in-
come, in one of which the wife works and in the other not, then due to costs
of going out to work, saving in the former household may be lower. But this
is the wrong comparison. If one conditions …rst on the primary earner wage
and nonwage income, as well as on the female wage and on demographics, one
…nds that households in which the wife works save signi…cantly more than
those in which she does not, as indicated in the preceding tables. In other
words, the marginal propensity to save out of the second earner’s income is
very high, despite the presence of costs of going out to work. This is masked
in the former case by the fact that saving increases with primary earner
income, so a household with a non-working wife and a high-wage primary
earner may save a little more than a household with two lower-wage earners
and about the same household income. But to isolate the incremental e¤ect
of the female labour supply decision we should, at the very least, control for
the primary earner wage.
The studies cited fail to do this because, in the …rst instance, the un-
derlying structural model of household decision making with respect to con-
sumption and saving assumes that these endogenous variables depend only
on market wages, the interest rate and demographics. There is no exogenous
variable, such as the price of domestic output, which can explain variation
in these endogenous variables while holding wages rates and demographics
constant. In the second instance, in empirical work on life cycle consumption
behaviour, the convention is to assume within-period separability between
19See, for example, Attanasio and Banks (1998), and Blundell, Browning and Meghir
(1994).
10consumption and leisure, with both measured incorrectly because time spent
on domestic work is aggregated with pure leisure20. In other words, the mis-
leading comparisons in the existing literature are a logical consequence of
a modelling approach which ignores heterogeneity among households with
the same wage rates and demographics, and, simultaneously, omits expendi-
ture on domestic production in the measure of the household consumption
variable.
The empirical signi…cance of the di¤erence in the two approaches - ours
and that of the existing literature - can be illustrated by comparing the dis-
tribution of the household groups by net household (market) income and by
full income, and contrasting their saving pro…les. Table 5 compares the quar-
tile distribution of each household group by net household income (section
a) and by net full income (section b), and reports quartile medians of saving
and saving rates for each household group. The results are based on the more
restricted HES sub-sample used to derive the pro…les in Table 3.
From the table it can be seen that the two income variables give en-
tirely di¤erent distributions of the household groups. Traditional households
are concentrated in the lower quartiles of the household income ordering, and
non-traditional in the upper quartiles. In contrast, the household groups tend
to be evenly distributed across full income. The con‡ict is due to the fact
that household market income is negatively related to domestic consump-
tion. Non-traditional households with relatively low wage rates but higher
levels of expenditure on market consumption appear in the same household
income quartile as traditional households with higher wage rates and higher
levels of domestic consumption. In the full income ranking, households with
the same wage rates and non-labour incomes appear in the same quartile.
Comparing the saving …gures for the three household groups in each quartile,
as in Figures 4 and 5, it is immediately apparent that the household market
income ranking either reverses or understates the di¤erences indicated by
the full income ranking, because it fails to control for wage rates. The full
income ranking suggests that, holding wage rates constant, non-traditional
households tend to save far more than traditional households in each quartile.
20That is, studies which try to estimate the life cycle allocation of household consump-
tion require a within-period demand system that includes consumption of domestic goods.
This same point is also made by Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright, (1991), and by McGrat-
ton, Rogerson and Wright (1997), in the context of macroeconomic growth and business
cycle models.
11In the next section, we present a modelling approach which attempts to
address these issues. In this model, we distinguish between households on
the basis of secondary earner market labour supply, using human capital and
associated productivity in household production as the variable that accounts
for across-household variation in this respect.
3 The Model
The household has a lifetime of T +1periods, with t =0 ;1;:::;T denoting
the period. In line with the empirical discussion in the previous section we
distinguish six phases of the household’s life cycle, which form a partition of
the set of time periods:
² Á1 = f0;::;¿ 1g: there are no children and the household has a relatively
strong preference for the market good;
² Á2 = f¿1 +1 ;::;¿ 2g: there are pre-school children and the household
has a relatively strong preference for the domestic good;
² Á3 = f¿2 +1 ;::;¿3g: the children are in primary school or early high
school years, and the household’s preference for market goods is higher
than in the second phase but lower than in the …rst;
² Á4 = f¿3 +1 ;::;¿4g: the children are at high school or have left school
and the household’s preference for market goods is higher than in the
third phase but lower than in the …rst;
² Á5 = f¿4 +1 ;::;¿5g: the children have left home, both adults are of
working age, there is again a high preference for market goods;
² Á6 = f¿5 +1 ;::;Tg: adults are retired and supply no market labour,
preferences are as in Á5:
There are three household types, indexed by h =1 ;2;3; which di¤er
according to the value of the female domestic productivity parameter kht.
The notation also allows this productivity to vary over time. However, the
ranking of the household types in terms of this parameter does not change
over time.





tu(xht;y ht;z 1ht;z 2ht;Áj) (1)
where ½ is a time preference discount factor, x is consumption of the market
good, y is consumption of the domestic good, z is consumption of pure leisure,
and the phase indicator Áj, j =1 ;::;6 determines tastes for household h.
Thus the phase of its life cycle the household is in determines its preferences
over domestic and market consumption and leisure. Note that households
are assumed to have identical preferences in any given phase of the life cycle.
Each individual i =1 ;2 in the household has the time constraint
aiht + liht + ziht = Ah =1 ;2;3;t=0 ;:::;T (2)
where l denotes a market labour supply, a the supply of labour to domestic
production and A is total available time. The production functions of the
household good are
yht = f(a1ht;a 2ht;kht) h =1 ;2;3;t=0 ;:::;T (3)
Note however that for t 2 Á6, the retirement phase, liht =0 ,a n ds oi np e r i o d s
corresponding to this phase aiht and ziht are the only time use variables. The
budget constraints in each period are
xht + st =
2 X
i=1
witliht +( 1+r)st¡1 t 2 Áj;j=1 ;::;5 (4)
xht + st = P +( 1+r)st¡1 t 2 Á6 (5)
sT =0 = s¡1 (6)
where wit is i’s net of tax market wage at t (we thus allow the possibility
of changes in the wage over time), st is saving (> 0)o rd i s s a v i n g( < 0)a t
t =0 ;1;:::;T, P is the lump sum pension payment per period and r is the one-
period market interest rate, assumed constant over time. To be consistent
with the assumption that there is no bequest motive, which implies saving
at zero in the last period of life, we also assume there is no inherited wealth,
so that assets are also zero at the beginning of period 0.T h e s ec o n s t r a i n t s














t =0 h =1 ;2;3 (7)
13where ± =( 1+r)¡1 is the market discount factor and ¿5+1is the …rst period
of the retirement phase.
The household maximises (1) subject to (2), (3) and (7). The …rst order









¡ ¹ht =0 h =1 ;2;3;t=0 ;::;T (9)
¸hwit±








¡ ¼iht =0 i =1 ;2;h=1 ;2;3;t=0 ;::;T (12)
together with the constraints. Here ¸h is the household’s marginal utility of
wealth and the ¹ht, the Lagrange multipliers associated with the production
function constraints, give the discounted marginal utility of the domestic
output. The ¼iht are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the time con-
straints (2).
We see from (8) that the marginal utility of consumption of the market
good, weighted by the ratio of discount factors (½=±)t, must be constant over
time, and equal to the marginal utility of wealth, but since this marginal util-
ity of market good consumption is in general a function of the consumption
of both market and household goods, this does not imply constancy of the
time path of market consumption, even within a given phase Áj.T h eo p t i m a l
consumption paths depend on the implicit price of the domestic good (recall






t =0 ;::;¿5 (13)
as the current value implicit price of the domestic good, which is equal to
the undiscounted marginal cost of the domestic good. In general this will
depend on the level of output of the domestic good, as well as on the after-
tax wage rates and the marginal productivities, which in turn depend on the
productivity parameters kht. The …rst two conditions then yield the standard




14The time paths of consumption of both goods will depend on how this price
varies over time, as well as on how transitions between phases of the life
cycle change the relative preferences for market and household goods. Dif-
ferences across households in this price will lead to di¤erences both in their
within-period time and consumption allocations and in their time pro…les of
consumption, even given identical preferences across households. At given
wage rates, a household with higher productivity in household production
will have a lower value of this price and therefore will have a higher demand
for domestic output, assuming this is not a Gi¤en good. This does not nec-
essarily imply that this household will have a higher domestic time input -
lower market labour supply - however, because higher productivity implies
that a given domestic output can be produced with a smaller time input.
Thus we cannot say ap r i o r ithat traditional (non-traditional) households
are those with higher (lower) productivities in domestic production.21 With
a given domestic productivity, the higher the wage rate, the higher the price
of the domestic good, but since household income is also higher, the net e¤ect
on the demand for the domestic good is ambiguous. However, the assump-
tion that labour supply increases with the wage is equivalent in this model
to assuming that demand for the household good falls with wage-induced
increases in its price.
In the retirement phase, the household is in a sense at a corner solution
with zero values of market labour supplies. In that case the opportunity cost
of time spent in household production is not the wage rate, but the current
money value of foregone leisure, !iht ´ ¼iht=¸h±t. Thus we de…ne the implicit






t 2 Á6 (15)
Then, condition (14) still applies, with the implicit price of domestic output
now determining the time paths of consumption of the market and household
goods and leisure in the retirement phase. Accumulated savings and the ‡ow
of pension payments also play an important role of course.
The conditions (8) - (12) assume no corner solutions, and in particular
(10) rules out (except trivially) households with a zero market labour supply.
For these however we simply have the condition
w2t · !2ht (16)
21For a formal proof, see Apps and Rees (1999b).
15and it is the implicit price of the household good as de…ned in (15), and not
as in (13), that determines the time paths of consumptions.
We now go on to formulate a simpli…ed version of this model, which can be
estimated on the available data. We will then use the parameter estimates to
calibrate the model and simulate the e¤ects on household saving and labour
supplies of various types of policy changes.
4 Empirical Speci…cation
To make the model tractable, while retaining the aspects of main interest,
we make the following assumptions:
1. Each individual has …xed pure leisure.






3. The primary earner has a …xed labour supply, ¹ l1ht; and therefore a …xed
time allocation to domestic production, ¹ a1ht: This implies that the price of
the domestic good is determined by the productivity of the secondary earner.
4. Preferences and all exogenous variables are constant within a phase.




h =1 ;2;3;j=1 ;::;6 (18)





The taste changes corresponding to changes in life cycle phases are assumed
just to change the parameters in the indirect utility function directly.
It is useful to recast the solution of the model presented in Section 3 as
a two-step procedure. First de…ne full consumption as
cht = xht + phtyht (20)
Taking cht and pht as given for each t means that (20) can be regarded as
a within-period budget constraint. Solving for within-period consumptions
16and labour supplies yields the indirect utility function in (18). The wealth















t ´ W (21)
where “full wealth” W is exogenous (given the assumption that pure leisures
are exogenous and constant), and depends on after-tax wage rates and pen-
sion payments.











tcht = W (23)
The solution to this problem yields the life cycle and across-household pro…les
of full consumption, and the estimated demand and labour supply functions
within periods can then be used to derive pro…les of market and domestic
consumption, saving and secondary earner labour supplies. Given the as-








tcht = W (25)
The important thing to note is that the marginal utility of full consumption in
each period depends on the price of the domestic good, pht,a n dt h e r e f o r eo n
the secondary earner’s wage rate and the productivity parameter kht.T h u s
the entire time pro…le of full consumption, as well as its allocation within
each period as between market and domestic consumption, depends on this
parameter. The solution of the system is given very simply by










h =1 ;2;3;t2 Áj;j=1 ;::;5 (28)
17Thus, we can translate the policy changes considered in Section 5 into changes
in the implicit prices of the household good and household wealth, use (26) to
(28) to solve for the resulting time pro…les of full consumption, and then use
the within-period functions to solve for market consumption, consumption
of the domestic good, household saving and female labour supply.
5 Within-period demand system
The policy analysis to follow requires estimates of the preference parameters
of the within-period functions. For this purpose we can select estimates from
the literature or, alternatively, estimate a system on the data used in the
empirical analysis in Section 2. We choose the latter strategy.
We select the Almost Ideal (AI) demand system speci…cation for the
indirect utility function in (18). Suppressing the subscripts h and j,t h e
function takes the form
u(p;c)=( l n ( c) ¡ lna(p))=b(p) (29)
where p = w2=k is the implicit price of the domestic good, c is full consump-
tion and the price indexes a(p) and b(p) are given by
lna(p)=®0 + ®y(d)lnp +0 :5°yy(d)ln
2 p (30)
b(p)=¯y(d)lnp (31)
where ®0, ®y(d), °yy(d) and ¯y(d) are parameters and, to allow for preference







y lnd,w h e r elnd is the log of the number of








Household demands in share form are
Sy = ®y(d)+°yy(d)lnp + ¯y(d)ln(c=a(p)) + "y (32)
Sx = ®x(d)+°xy(d)lnp + ¯xln(c=a(p)) + "x (33)
where Sx = x=c,a n dSy = py=c. Given adding up, we need only estimate
the share equation for the domestic good.
18We estimate the model on data for a sample of 1907 households records
selected from the HES sample described previously, on criteria listed in Ap-
pendix A. The sample is restricted to non-traditional households with a full
time employed male partner. Since each record contains information on time
use from the TUS and on net wage rates, we can compute expenditure on
domestic production. However, information on domestic output, and there-
fore on k,i sm i s s i n ga n ds op cannot be computed. To deal with this problem
we estimate the model specifying the share equation in (32) in the standard
form as
Sy = ®y(d)+°yylnw2 + ¯y ln(c=a(w2)) + »y (34)
where
lna(w2)=®0 + ®y(d)lnw2 +0 :5°yy(d)ln
2 w2 (35)
We then interpret »y as
»y =0 :5°yy(d)ln
2 k +( ¯y(d)®y(d) ¡ °yy)lnk + "y (36)
and attribute variation in specialisation in domestic production across house-
holds to di¤erences in k,b ys e t t i n g"y =0 . The positive solution to this
equation gives a value for k for each record which can then be used to com-
pute the domestic price p on which to base policy simulations. Note that the
standard labour supply model omits the domestic price and therefore implies
setting k =1 .22
The parameter estimates for phases to 1 to 5 are reported in Appendix
A. The results imply wage elasticities, evaluated at data means, of 0.0531 for
households in phase 1, 0.8604, 1.0514, 0.9248 and 0.5595 for non-traditional
PT households in phases 2, 3, 4 and 5, and 0.2524, 0.3345, 0.3212 and 0.1254
for non-traditional FT households in the same phases, respectively. These
elasticities support the proposition that, with the presence of children, market
and domestic production are relatively close substitutes. In phase 1 the
female wage elasticity is close to zero. The next lowest wage elasticity for
each type appears in phase 5 when the children have left home. Elasticities
are, as we would expect, typically higher for married women in part time
work.
22The standard model of household labour supply assumes each partner’s net wage is the
price of output from an hour of domestic work as well as the price of an hour of pure leisure.
This implies that each type of domestic labour - male or female - is equally productive
across all households. If this assumption does not hold, we can expect parameter bias
due to the omitted domestic price variables in the hours equations.
196 Policy Simulations
We use the parameters of the demand model to explore the implications
of changes in tax policy. Our aim is to illustrate the importance of taking
account of the heterogeneity of household types with respect to household
labour supply and saving behaviour, in analysing the e¤ects of a policy change
on these variables.
For this purpose we construct a hypothetical data set containing 18
records, one for each household type in each phase. The information for
each record is based largely on the data means and medians of matching
samples selected from the ABS …les on the criteria that the reference person
of the household is male and is employed in phases 1 to 5, that both part-
ners of households in phase 1 are employed, and that the reference person
of households in phase 6 is 75 years of age or under. Applying these criteria
gives a sub-sample of households in phases 2 to 5 which is the same as that
used to derive the pro…les in Tables 3 and 4. The records for these house-
holds contain the median saving and data means for market hours, domestic
hours and number of children shown in these tables, with the exception of
market hours for traditional households. We set market hours of work for
traditional households in phases 2 to 5 to 200 hours pa. This allows us to
avoid the problem of corner solutions and, as well, to capture labour supply
e¤ects for traditional households with a marginal work force attachment over
the life cycle but recording zero hours on a “current” basis.23 The selection
criteria for phase 1 implies there are no non-participants by choice in this
phase. Each household type in phase 1 is represented by a record containing
the data means for time use and median saving computed for the full sub-
sample in this phase. The records for households in phase 6 are also identical,
since the data do not allow the types to be distinguished. Saving in this last
phase is set at zero. All records contain the mean net wage for each partner
derived from information on earnings, market hours and taxes, as described
23Simulations which assume zero hours for the wife on the basis of “current” data for
employment status and hours of work can be expected to understate the true labour
supply e¤ects for this highly responsive group. Many married women reporting their
current employment status as “not in the work force” are likely to be working at other
times of the year. This is evident from the fact that participation rates cited on an annual
basis are typically much higher than rates based on current employment status, where the
“current” period is one or two weeks. The discrepancy between annual and current rates
is even greater when the latter is based on time use data obtained by diary, as in the TUS
where the information is collected for two diary days.
20in Appendix A. The simulations are based on the assumption that the gov-
ernment provides an income tested pension of $10000 pa in retirement and
that, applying the income test, only traditional households are eligible.
We consider two stylised reforms. “Reform 1” combines a 10 per cent rise
in the tax rate on the wage income of the female partner and a reduction
in the rate on that of the male partner set to achieve revenue neutrality.
“Reform 2” does the reverse, combining a reduction of 10 per cent in the tax
rate on the female’s wage income with an increase in the rate on that of the
male partner, again set to achieve revenue neutrality. These reforms can be
interpreted as capturing the change in tax rates on the earnings of partners
typical of changes in the progressivity of a tax system based on individual
incomes.24 Because, in most households, the earnings of the female partner
are much lower than those of the male partner, the progressive taxation of
individual incomes implies lower marginal and average rates for the female
partner within each household. A revenue neutral reform which reduces
progressivity can therefore be represented by an increase in the tax rate on
the wage income of female partners, with the proceeds used to …nance a
reduction in the rate on the wage income of male partners, as in Reform 1.
Similarly, a reform which increases progressivity can be represented as one
which reduces the tax rate on the female wage and raises it on the male wage,
as in Reform 2.25
The …rst step in the policy analysis is to simulate the pre-reform equilib-
rium. Using the parameters of the demand system in the preceding section,
we …rst solve for k f o re a c hr e c o r du s i n g( 3 6 )a n dw et h e nu s et h er e s u l tt o
compute the price of the domestic good. Next we derive the life cycle dis-
tribution of consumption, using (26) to (28) and incorporating a household
equivalence scale for each phase and type26. The interest rate is set at 1
p e rc e n ta n dt h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ei sa s s u m e dt ob et h es a m ea st h e
24As in the case of the Australian income tax system.
25Alternatively, Reform 1 can be interpreted as a shift from a system of individual
taxation to one based on joint income, as in the US or Germany, and Reform 2 as a
change in the opposite direction. For further explanation and a detailed analysis of reforms
speci…ed and interpreted in this way, see Apps and Rees (1999b)
26The equivalence scales are computed as the error terms in the pre-reform simulation
of the life cycle distribution of consumption.The results implied equivalence scales of 0.96,
1.62, 1.46, 1.32, 1.07, and 1.0 in phases 1-6 respectively. Note that the life cycle model
we have speci…ed assumes a perfect capital market. This assumption may well not be
realistic. In the case of imperfect capital markets the error terms can be interpreted as a
measure of the e¤ects of constraints on borrowing.
21interest rate. Pre-reform life cycle and across-household pro…les of female
hours of work, net market income, full consumption expenditure and saving
are reported in Table 6, columns 1 to 4, respectively.
The post-reform equilibrium values of the same variables are reported in
Table 7 for Reform 1 and Table 8 for Reform 2. Column 5 of the tables gives
the tax gain (loss) under the respective reforms. Note that saving, shown in
column 4, is derived as the di¤erence between full consumption expenditure
a n dt h es u mo fn e tm a r k e ti n c o m ea n de x p e n d i t u r eo nt h ed o m e s t i cg o o d ,
using the results for full consumption expenditure computed by equating the
marginal utility of income across the life cycle phases by substituting the
b(p) index of the demand system in (28).
Reform 1 has the overall e¤ect of reducing saving for the retirement phase,
in terms of present value, from an average of $18825 to $17741 per annum.
There are di¤erent e¤ects for each household type. The saving of tradi-
tional households falls from $2841 to $2131. Saving by the non-traditional
PT households falls from $20060 to $19022 and that by non-traditional FT
households, from $33572 to $32069. The 10.00 per cent increase in the tax
rate on female earnings …nances a reduction of only 4.23 per cent in the rate
on male earnings. The large gap between the two rates is due the fact that
the average wage income of the female partner is less than half that of the
male partner. This wage income di¤erential is reinforced by the negative
e¤ect of the reform on female labour supply.
Reform 2 has the opposite e¤ect on labour supply and saving. Overall,
saving for the retirement phase rises from the pre-reform average of $18825
to $19825 per annum. In this case the saving of traditional households rises
from $2841 to $3482. Saving by the non-traditional PT households rises from
$20060 to $21018 and that by non-traditional FT households, from $33572
to $34973. The 10.00 per cent reduction in the tax rate on female earnings
requires a rate of 4.49 per cent on male earnings for revenue neutrality. The
rate increase is larger in absolute value than the 4.23 rate reduction under
Reform 1 due to the positive e¤ects of Reform 2 on female labour supply.
>From column 5 of the tables it can be seen that Reform 1 implies a shift
in the tax burden from traditional households to those in which the female
partner has a signi…cant work force attachment. Under Reform 1 traditional
households are the bene…ciaries, gaining an increase in net income in all
working phases of the life cycle apart from phase 1, when both partners
are employed. For non-traditional PT households, the gains for the male
partner almost cancel out the losses for the female partner. Non-traditional
22FT households pay more tax in each working phase of the life cycle, in e¤ect
…nancing the gains for traditional households. The reform reduces the present
discounted value of life time wealth, averaged across the household types,
to $2.82m, from a pre-reform level of $2.90m. Reform 2 has an opposite
distributional e¤ect in the case of each household type, and increases the
mean present value of life time wealth to $2.97m.
The pre-reform present value of life time wealth ranges from $2.79m for
the traditional household to $3.04m for the non-traditional FT household.
The lower value for the traditional household is due primarily to the fact that
the household has more pure leisure in phases 2 to 5, and so the simulations
are based on a correspondingly smaller time constraint. From Table 4 it can
be seen that, for example, in phase 2 the traditional household works 4299
hours per annum, the non-traditional PT household, 4538 hours, and the
non-traditional FT households, 4970. Similar di¤erences carry across phase
3, 4 and 5. Since there is relatively little variation in net wage rates by
household type within each phase, the households have similar full incomes,
computed on the basis of a time constraint including pure leisure. Since the
traditional household has signi…cantly more leisure, the net wealth di¤erence
between traditional and non-traditional households would be much greater,
were it not for the income-tested pension. In e¤ect, the household chooses
between more lifetime leisure, together with lower taxes and a pension, versus
less lifetime leisure combined with higher taxes and no pension. From this
perspective it seems likely that there may be a very close trade-o¤ between
work and pure leisure, which is not re‡ected in the results. In other words,
the wage elasticities we have estimated may seriously understate the negative
e¤ects of Reform 1 on life time labour supply and saving, and the positive
e¤ects of Reform 2 on these variables.
Since the simulations are based on household records with similar full
incomes and present discounted values of life time wealth, the results do not
capture distributional e¤ects with respect to the dispersion of wealth and
full incomes across households. The data suggest that the gender wage gap
within a household tends to rise with the male wage, a re‡ection of the fact
that there are very few high wage women. Turning to Table 5 in Section 2,
we would therefore expect all three types of households in the top quartile
of full income to be net bene…ciaries of Reform 1, because the loss incurred
b yt h ef e m a l ep a r t n e rw o u l db em o r et h a no ¤ s e tb yt h eg a i nb yt h em a l e
partner. Overall, the reform would shift a greater share of the tax burden
to non-traditional FT households in middle quartiles because they would, in
23e¤ect, be …nancing most of the gains in the top quartile, and so the negative
e¤ects on the wealth, labour supply and saving of these households would be
correspondingly greater.
Distributional e¤ects of this kind are entirely lost by an analysis which
ignores domestic consumption and presents results by household market in-
come. Non-traditional FT households with median wages are confused with
much higher-wage traditional households and located towards the top quar-
tile, as indicated in Table 5, part (a). To illustrate, Table 9 presents the
quartile household income distributions of tax gains and losses for households
in phases 2 to 5 under the two reforms.
The …rst section of the table shows the distribution of the 12 records in
these phases, by household income. The traditional records are concentrated
in quartile 1 and the non-traditional FT records, in quartile 4. the result
is that Reform 1 appears to be highly redistributional, and Reform 2 highly
regressive, when in fact all records have similar full incomes and lifetime
wealth. Results of this kind can misleadingly suggest a trade-o¤ between
equity and disincentive e¤ects on labour supply and saving, when none in
fact exists.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have been able, by merging three data sets, to exam-
ine the relationships among income, consumption, saving, male and female
labour supplies, wage rates and family size for a cross section of households.
We de…ned the life cycle not in terms of years, but rather in terms of the
phases through which a typical household moves. We showed that the much-
discussed ”excess sensitivity” of market consumption to market income does
not apply to full consumption and income. Full consumption rises sharply
when couples …rst have children, because of the high cost and/or poor avail-
ability of market substitutes to domestic child care and capital market con-
straints, then declines slowly and steadily over the life cycle. The ”excess
sensitivity” of market consumption to market income is, we argue, due to
the fact that as the household moves through the life cycle, market income
tracks female market labour supply, which in turn responds to changes in
the composition of the household’s consumption demand as between market
and domestic goods over the life cycle. Since increasing female labour sup-
ply is associated with a substitution of market for domestic consumption,
24the co-movement in market income and consumption is essentially driven by
this process. We also argue that the puzzlingly large drop in post-retirement
market consumption is readily explained once we take account of the large
increase in time spent in domestic production that occurs in this phase. The
fall in full consumption is much less sharp and re‡ects a moderate increase
in pure leisure.
All this refers to the ”average household”. This paper has however
placed major emphasis on the heterogeneity of households. Households with
the same wage rates and demographic characteristics make widely di¤ering
choices of female market labour supply. We attribute this to di¤erences in
human capital and productivity in household production. We also show that
the di¤erences in female labour supply are associated with large di¤erences
in saving, with a high propensity to save out of secondary earner income. We
provide a formal life cycle model to capture these di¤erences, and then cali-
brate a simpli…ed version of this model on the data. It is often argued that
an increase in household income inequality, brought about by a reduction in
the degree of progressivity of income taxation, will increase saving. We use
the calibrated model to show that this does not happen, when the e¤ect of
the tax reform is to reduce the net wage of secondary earners, increase that
of primary earners, and so redistribute net income from households with a
high, to households with a zero-to-low female labour supply. In conclusion,
we hope to have demonstrated the usefulness and relevance of the approach
we adopt in this paper, for the analysis of issues of public policy.
25Appendix A
In this appendix we discuss the methods used to combine information
from the ABS 1993 HES, 1994 IDS and 1992 TUS, for computing the data
medians and means tabulated in section 2, estimating the demand system
in section 5 and constructing the hypothetical data set for the simulations
reported in section 6. We also present the parameter estimates of the within-
period demand system.
The data requirements of the empirical analysis include the usual micro-
level information on within-period market consumption expenditure and net
household income available in the HES.27 I n f o r m a t i o no nw a g er a t e si sm i s s -
ing from the HES because it omits detail on hours of market work, recording
only employment status de…ned as “employed full time”, “employed part
time”, “unemployed” or “not in the work force”. Detailed information on
hours of market work is available in the IDS. Data on domestic work and
pure leisure are available in the TUS but missing from both the HES and
the IDS. As noted in Section 2, the …rst step in combining information from
these complementary data sets is to select matching samples of two-adult
households from each. We then merge information on time use from the
T U Sw i t ht h ed a t af o re a c hr e c o r di nt h eH E Sa n dI D Sm a t c h i n gs a m p l e s ,
and we estimate a net wage for each partner. This allows us to compute full
consumption and full income.
The data merging procedures are as follows. Records in the IDS sample
are augmented with data on pure leisure from the TUS using a split-sample
instrumental variables approach.28 We instrument for pure leisure using a
regression model for each household type, specifying demographic, education
and occupation variables as regressors. We then compute domestic hours of
work by subtracting market hours from total time allocated to market and
domestic work. The latter is obtained by subtracting pure leisure from an
27We follow the convention in the literature of computing “saving” as the residual be-
tween current consumption expenditure and net income (see, for example, Attanasio and
Banks (1998) and Banks, Blundell and Tanner (1998)). The ABS (1995) takes the view
that because HES income and expenditure estimates do not balance for individual house-
holds (for reasons listed on p.27) that the di¤erence between average weekly expenditure
and income cannot be considered as a measure of saving. However, we suggest that for
the purposes of most studies, including those of the present, where the focus is on changes
in the relationship between consumption expenditure and income, the di¤erence between
the two can provide useful insights into life cycle saving behaviour.
28For a detailed discussion of the approach see, for example, Angrist and Kruger (1992).
26overall time constraint, set at 5840 hours (16 hours a day for 365 days per
year).29 Expenditure on the domestic good is computed as the product of
the domestic work variable and the net wage. Full income is obtained as the
product of this time constraint and the net wage.
The computation of the net wage for each partner involves a number of
steps. We compute gross hourly earnings for participants from data on “the
number of hours usually worked per week in main and second jobs” and
“total annual 1993/94 earned income”, and we also calculate a marginal tax
rate for each adult from information on direct taxes. Because the income tax
schedule is progressive, we predict a net wage for each partner, correcting
for selectivity in the case of a non-participating female partner, based on a
regression model in which the dependent net wage variable is calculated using
an “average” marginal tax rate for each type of worker. Unless we make this
adjustment we obtain implausibly high net wage rates for non-participants.
The HES matching sample is augmented with information on domestic
work from the TUS and net wages from the IDS, again using instrumental
variables. The domestic hours of work variable of each partner is instru-
mented for each household type using demographic characteristics and per-
sonal attributes. The net wage of each partner and, in turn, the net full
income of the household, are computed as described for augmenting the IDS
sample with information on the same variables.
The results for the parameters of the demand system are presented in
Table A. The system is estimated on a sample of 1907 household records
selected from the HES sample on the additional criteria that the household
is non-traditional, the male partner is employed full time and both partners
report positive incomes. Under these criteria, the sample excludes traditional
households and all records in phase 6. Each record is augmented with time
use and net wage information following the procedures described above. In
the policy simulations, retired households are assumed to have the same
preferences as households in phase 5.
The results indicate that all coe¢cients, apart from those on the log of
household size in phases 2 and 3 (in some cases), are signi…cant at the 5 per
cent level.
29In empirical work on labour supply the convention is to compute non-market hours
(typically referred to as ”leisure”) from an overall time constraint. Here we are implicitly
following this convention because the model we estimate and the reforms simulations treat
total time allocated to market and domestic work as the time constraint. This is consistent
with our assumption of separability between pure leisure and full consumption.
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TABLE 1  Median saving by stage in life cycle ($ pa, 1993) 
 

















HES    
cell size 
6 
1  41938 35343  4524  54338  119534 676 
2  30706 32379  -208  86572  129487 860 
3  36296 36659 416  81127  132546 726 
4  44460 42264  1872  76072  135435 771 
5  37076 33689  3172  65052  136974 969 
6  17212 20737  -1664  56418  132980  1060 




TABLE 2  Mean hours of work and # kids 

















1  1733  805  2538  1481 1244 2725  - 
2  1734 1503 3237 507  3838 4345  1.91 
3  1809 1317 3126 737  3149 3886  2.66 
4  1733  928  2661  1023 2150 3173  1.75 
5  1505 910 2415  773 1830  2603  - 
6  0 1479  1479  148  2027  2175  - 




































HES    
cell size 
6 
(a)Traditional households  1046 
2  28600  30844 -1352 87074 129145  346 
3  32188 33217 -780 82613  129942  241 
4  34320  33888 -1924 73244 131490  176 
5  32032 30011 1872 61267  131455  283 
(b) Non-traditional PT households  764 
2  38324 35736 2444 88135  130067  189 
3  42328 38974 1768 85402  131973  183 
4  45240 43601 3900 79187  131846  210 
5  46072 40239 7540 68964  129988  182 
(c) Non-traditional FT households  665 
2  46696 37245 9024 83050  127266  121 
3  51740 41644 9022 78232  131864  136 
4  56810 48135 7228 78109  134376  218 




TABLE 4  Mean hours of work and # kids 

















(a)Traditional households   
2  2241 1186  3427  65 4234 4299 1.90 
3  2384 1036  3420  131 3566 3697 2.75 
4  2261  788 3049  143 2669 2812  1.73 
5  2182 713  2895  21 2177  2198  - 
(b) Non-traditional PT households    
2  2258 1307  3465  929 3609 4538 1.81 
3  2280 1187  3467  998 3023 4021 2.46 
4  2292 849  3141  1079  2233  3312 1.79 
5  2221 782  3003  1009  1808  2817  - 
(c) Non-traditional FT households   
2  2287  1332 3619  2038 2932  4970  1.68 
3  2426  1018 3444  2122 2287  4409  2.22 
4  2350 905  3255  2055  1617  3672 1.75 









TABLE 5  Median saving by quartiles of net household and full income 
($pa,1993) 
Quartile 1  2  3  4  All 
  (a) Net household income 
Traditional %   76.9 52.8 23.1  15.8  42.3 
Saving $pa  -2080  260  3822  16666  -468 
Non-trad PT %  17.7 35.1 39.0  31.7  30.9 
Saving $pa  -3510  2090  5252  10738  3952 
Non-trad FT %  5.3 12.1  37.7  52.5  26.9 
Saving $pa  -6188  3536  7644  12948  8684 
(b) Net full income 
Traditional %   44.1 45.5 42.2  37.3  42.3 
Saving $pa  -1508  -468  676  1508  -468 
Non-trad PT %  30.2 29.5 31.6  32.1  30.9 
Saving $pa  520  2340  5720  6734  3952 
Non-trad FT %  25.7 25.0 26.2  30.6  26.9 





























(a) Traditional households 
1  1887 41556  55275  5247 
2  200 28635  86217  -1352 
3  200 32007  82183  -780 
4  200 33270  74550  -1924 
5  200 30449  59834  1872 
6  0 12841  51067  0 
  (b) Non-traditional PT households 
1  1887 41556  55275  5247 
2  929 37200  87155  2444 
3  998 39458  83117  2768 
4  1079 42618  74305  3940 
5  1009 38302  59488  7540 
6  0 20060  58286  0 
(c) Non-traditional PT households 
1  1887 41556  55275  5247 
2  2038 48295  85046  9054 
3  2122 52348  79915  9022 
4  2055 54315  77061  7228 
5  2070 53295  69787  9282 











































  (a) Traditional households 
1  1878 40613  54191  4478  855 
2  59 28304  83026  -1443  -1071 
3  33 31540  79643  -811  -1237 
4  41 32847  72781  -1898  -1276 
5  91 30463  58661  1852  -1114 
6  0 12131  50357  0  0 
  (b) Non-traditional PT households 
1  1880 40637  53976  4693  857 
2  833 36579  83597  2623  -344 
3  875 38515  80230  2734  -330 
4  960 41606  72254  3687  -276 
5  934 37710  58090  7158  -196 
6  0 19022  57248  0  0 
  (c) Non-traditional FT households 
1  1883 40656  53805  4864  859 
2  1979 46868  81315  8923  833 
3  2045 50678  76893  8705  864 
4  1985 52718  74697  6911  831 
5  2046 52137  67932  8776  891 












































  (a) Traditional households 
1  1900 42426  56263  5982  -746 
2  326 28942  89192  -1194  954 
3  346 32416  84534  -728  1085 
4  337 33603  76173  -1977  1134 
5  296 30358  60904  1836  1066 
6  0 13483  51709  0  0 
  (b) Non-traditional PT households 
1  1896 42396  56478  5766  -744 
2  1016 37762  90508  2314  316 
3  1005 40325  85823  2822  254 
4  1182 43526  76213  4083  209 
5  1076 38809  60783  7869  201 
6  0 21018  59244  0  0 
  (c) Non-traditional FT households 
1  1894 42373  56650  5595  -741 
2  2091 49637  88585  9222  -792 
3  2190 53913  82766  9340  -847 
4  2116 55787  79280  7512  -796 
5  2095 54339  71523  9734  -772 
















TABLE 9  Gains (losses) by quartiles of net household income in  
life cycle phases 2 to 5 
   
Quartile 1  2  3  4  All 
# Traditional  3 1     4 
# Non-traditional PT   2  2    4 
# Non-traditional FT     1  3  4 
Pre-reform          
Net market income  30461  35739  41811  53514  41338 
Post-Reform 1          
Net $ gain (loss) pa  1137  826  52  -861  198 
Post-Reform 1          




















Parameter  Estimate  (Std error)     
  α y  0.2194 (0.0146) 
1111       γ yy   0.1327 (0.0038) 
  β y  -0.1031 (0.0067) 
  α y
0
    0.5348 (0.0190) 
  α y
1
  (lnd)  0.1177 (0.0238) 
2222       γ yy
0
    0.1084 (0.0224) 
  γ yy
1  (lnd)  -0.0155 (0.0336 
  β y
0
   -0.2696 (0.0192) 
  β y
1  (lnd)  -0.0307 (0.0290) 
  α y
0
    0.4311 (0.0189) 
  α y
1
  (lnd)  0.0152 (0.0225) 
3333       γ yy
0
    0.0767 (0.0279) 
  γ yy
1  (lnd)  0.0912 (0.0321) 
  β y
0
   -0.2163 (0.0273) 
  β y
1  (lnd)  -0.0559 (0.0297) 
  α y
0
    0.3165 (0.0093) 
  α y
1
  (lnd)  0.0882 (0.0162) 
4444       γ yy
0
    0.1085 (0.0225) 
  γ yy
1  (lnd)  -0.0155 (0.0336 
  β y
0
   -0.1348 (0.0135) 
  β y
1  (lnd)  -0.0447 (0.0226) 
  α y  0.3009 (0.0045) 
5555       γ yy   0.1234 (0.0061) 
  β y  -0.1155 (0.0074) 
LogL   3368.51   




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Saving by quartiles of net full income
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